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I N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASH I NGTON
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Plaintiffs,
v.
BOYD WALTON, JR., et ux., et al.,
Defendan ts,
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COLVILLE CONFEDERATED TRIBES

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

CIVIL NO. 3421 ~

RESPONSE OF THE UNITED
STATES TO THE DEFENDANTS'
AND STATES ' FINAL ARGUMEN S

Defendant/Intervenor .
__________________________________
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.

WI LLIAM BOYD WALTON , et ux., et a l .,
and THE STATE OF WASHI NGTON,
Defendants.
_ _ __

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL NO . 3831
FILED IN THE

U. S. DISTRICT COURT
Eastern District of Washington

ocr 2 G1982

)
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_ _ _ _ __ __ __ _ _ _ ___ )
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The United States of America, plain tiff in Civi l

~o .

3831 , submits the fo llowing memo randum to s et forth its position
upon certa i n issues raised in final argument before this court on
October 1, 19 82 .
I

RESERVED RIGHTS FOR FISHING PURPOSES, AS
RIGHTS OWNED BENEFICIALLY BY A TRI BE AS AN ENTITY ,
ARE NOT SUBJECT TO A PRO RATA DIVISION AMONG
INDIVIDUALS UPON ALLOTMENT~THE RESERVAT ION.
Coun sel for the defendant Walton appears to suggest that
individ ual al lotte es , upon allotment, acquir e a propor t ionate shar
of water res erved for fishing purposes.

Exc erp t of Fina l Argument ,

October 1, 1982 , 19-21 (hereinafter " Final Argumen t").
sition is contrary to law .

This propo

Fish i ng rights are tribally- owned

property right s; they are not held by individuals .

This court

spec ifically so held in Un ited State s v. Wash i ngton, 520 F .2d 676,
688, 691 (9th Ci r. 1975).

See a l so Wash ington v. Fi shing Vessel
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Ass'n., 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th

1
2

3
4
5

Cir. 1974); Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 818 (1962).
The tribal fishing right does not depend on land ownership.
~,

Rather, it may be retained on lands ceded by a tribe, see,
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968);

6

Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919); Kennedy

7

v. Becker, 24 U.S. 556 (1916); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S.

8

371 (1905); or on lands subject to allotment,

9

States v. Washington, supra; Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n.,

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

see,~,

United

supra; Whitefoot v. United States, supra.
Collective tribal ownership of fishing rights mandates
similar tribal ownership of all water rights necessary to effectuat
the fishing rights.

United States v. Anderson, Civil No. 3643

(E.D. Wash. July 23, 1979); see also United States v. Washington,
Phase II, 506 F.Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980), appeal pending.
As a tribal right not contingent on land ownership, the
right to water for fishing purposes did not pass to individual
tribal members along with land title.

Tribal membership, not land

19
20
21

allottees who are tribal members retain full rights to exercise

22

the tribe's fishing rights, as do tribal members residing off the

23
24

reservation.

25
26

based on his status as successor-in-interest to an allottee, is

ownership, entitles an individual to share in the tribal fishing
right and its related water right.

It also follows that Walton's claim to a proportiona e

share of the water reserved to the Tribe for fishing purposes,

without merit.

27

28
29

30

31
32

It follows that individual

II
THE CORRECT PRIORITY DATE FOR THE TRIBES'
FISHING WATER RIGHT IS TIME IMMEMORIAL
A bedrock principle of Indian law is that a tribe retain
all those rights held aboriginally that are not expressly removed
UNITED STATES' RESPONSE - Page 2
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by the federal government or granted away through treaty.

See,

1

~~United

2

United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).

3
4

in large part served to confirm the Indians' preexisting rights.

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905); see also
Treaties or agreeme ts

See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
This axiom creates a distinction between those aboriginal
rights a tribe has reserved to itself, and those rights reserved
by the federal government -- motivated by whatever purposes of its
own-- for the Tribe.

See generally Felix Cohen's Handbook of

Indian Law, 590-591 (1982).

Federally reserved water rights have

as their priority date the date of the treaty, executive order or
other federal action reserving the right.

Aboriginal rights, in

contrast, have a priority date of time immemorial.

United States

13

v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336, 350 (D. Or. 1979), appeal pending

14
15
16
17

(hereinafter "Adair").

18
19
20
21
22

391

u.s.

See also Menominee Tribe v. United States,

404, 406 (1968).
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Colville Confederated Tribes

v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981) (hereinafter "Walton"),
did not directly address the question of the priority date for the
Tribes' fishery water rights.

Rather, the opinion examined whether

such a right existed, and found in the affirmative.

Id. at 48.

It is therefore important that the district court, in determining
the amount of water to which the Tribes are entitled for their No

23

Name Creek ·fishery, also clarify that the fishery water right, as

24

an aboriginal right, has a priority date of time immemorial.

25

This priority date is dictated by recent case law.

26

United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1979), appeal

27
28
29
30
31

pending, decreed an immemorial priority date for water used for

32

fishing and hunting purposes by the Klamath Tribe.

The Tribe had

aboriginally hunted and fished within the borders of the area
set aside in 1864 as the Klamath Indian Reservation.

In discussing

the Tribe's water rights, the court reasoned as follows:
UNITED STATES' RESPONSE - Page 3
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The p r inc i pal pur pose of the Treaty was to
prov i de an area for the exc l us i ve occu pation
of the I nd i ans so that they could continue
to be self - suff i cient. The Treaty provided
two ways for the Indians to be self - sufficient.

1
2

3
4
5
6

F i rs t , i t ensured that the In dians could con t i nue thei r trad i tional way of li fe wh i ch
i nc lud ed h untin g, f i sh in g , trap p ing , and
gathe ri ng. Artic l e I of the Treaty secured
to the Indians their right to pursue their
trad i tional way of l i fe.

7

Second , it encouraged t he Indians to adopt
agricu ltur e . . . .

8

When, by treaty, the government wi thdraws
land from the pub l ic domain and reserves it
for a federa l pur pose, the government
impl i edly reserves unappropr i ated water to
the extent needed to fulfill the purposes
of the reservat i on.
(Citations omitted) .
He r e, the government reserved land from the
pub lic doma i n and created the Klamath Reser vation to preserve Ind i an h un t i ng and f i shing
ri ghts and to encourage agricultur e .

9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17

I d . a t 345 (emphasis added).

origin of the hunt i ng and fishing right t he Indians reserved to
themselves in the treaty , dictated a pr i or i ty date of time immemori 1~
I d . at 350 .
It shou l d be emphas i zed t h at the basis for the i mmemoria l

18

19
20
21

22
23
24

25
26
27
28
29
30

31

The court then held that the aborigin 1

prior i ty date for water necessary t o preserve hunting and fishing
r ights for the Klamath Tr i be is the fact that these were " rights
which they had exe r cised for more than a thousand years . "
350.

Id. at

Accord i ngly, the proper focus of jud i cial inquiry is on the

h i sto ri ca l uses of water of t he tr i be[s ] i nvolved in a water adj udi
cation, as wel l as the specific purposes fo r which the reservation
was created.

With these princ i ples in hand, we turn to the Co l vil l

Tr i bes.
Li ke the Klamath Tribe in Ada ir, the Colville Tribes
aborig i nal l y occup i ed the lands eventually set aside as their
reservation .

4 Ind . Cl. Comm. at 187 - 189 and 1 96 - 199 (1956) .

Al so as in Ada i r , the Co l vi lle Tribes have from time i mmemoria l
UNITED STATES ' RESPONSE - Page 4
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hunted and fished within their reservation lands.

Long prior to

the establishment of the Colville Reservation, these bands relied

1
2
3

4
5
6

7
8
9

10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25
26
27
28

29
30

31

on salmon and trout fishing along the Columbia River and its
tributaries as a means of subsistence.

4 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 157-58.

The Ninth Circuit Walton opinion observes that the Colvilles
"traditionally fished for both salmon and trout" and that "[l]ike
other Pacific Northwest Indians, fishing was of economic and
religious importance to them."

Walton, 647 F.2d at 48.

Finally,

and again like the Adair court, the Ninth Circuit also held that
"preservation of the Tribe's access to fishing grounds was one
purpose for the creation of the Colville Reservation."

Id. at 48.

Under the Court of Appeals' analysis, the setting aside
of the Colville Reservation is properly viewed as, in part, a
formal recognition by the federal government of the Tribes'
traditional aboriginal fishing practices.

Through the creation

of the reservation, the Tribes guaranteed that such aboriginal
fishing practices might continue along the streams appurtenant
to the reservation.

See 4 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 190. This analysis,
1/
together with the principles set forth in Adair,- suggests that the

reserved rights doctrine here confirms the Tribes' immemorial use
of water, rather than creates a new, inferior priority to water
2/
which dates from the establishment of the reservation.- Thus,

1/ The only difference between Adair and Walton is
that the former case involved a reservation created by treaty,
whereas the Colville Reservation was established by Executive
Order. This distinction is insignificant, however, because the
Winters doctrine applies to both Executive Order and treaty
reservations. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599-600
(1963).
2/ This application of the Winters doctrine was
implicit in United States v. Gila Valle Irri ation District,
Globe Equity No. 59 (D. Ariz. 1935 , which involved rights to
water for agricultural purposes claimed by the United States on
behalf of the Pima-Maricopa Indian Tribes of the Gila River
Reservation. The reservation had been created by statutes and
Executive orders out of the aboriginal homeland of the Tribes in
part to enable the Tribes to preserve their agricultural way of
life. See Gila River Pima-Marico a Indian Communit , et al. v.
United states,
Ct. Cl.
, No. 236-C Decided
June 30, 1982), Slip op. at 14-15. By stipulated decree, the
reservation was adjudicated a priority date of time immemorial
for agricultural water use.

32
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the Confederated Colville Tribes are entitled to an immemorial

1

priority to water needed for maintenance of the No Name Creek

2

fishery.

3

III

4

INCHOATE RESERVED WATER RIGHTS CAN ONLY BE PERFECTED
BY THE ORIGINAL NON-INDIAN PURCHASER OF AN INDIAN
ALLOTMENT, THROUGH THE DILIGENT APPLICATION OF WATER
WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AFTER THE PURCHASE

5
6
7

8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

26
27
28

29
30
31
32

The Hearing Memorandum of the United States of America,
filed in this proceeding on May 5, 1982 (hereinafter "United
States Memorandum"), contains a detailed analysis of the proper
standards for determining due diligence in the perfection of
reserved water rights by the original non-Indian purchaser of an
Indian allotment.

Its most important points can be briefly

recapitulated as follows.
Once title to an Indian allotment has passed to a nonIndian, the non-Indian, "under no competitive disability vis-a-vis
other water users," Walton at 51, becomes subject to general
state law principles in regard to his or her perfection of the
right to a water appropriation.

United States Hearing Memorandum,

14-15.
State law requires that in making an appropriation, an
intended claim must be pursued with "reasonable diligence."
might summarize the meaning of "due diligence" as:

One

the standard

used to measure the time required to implement an intention or
plan to appropriate water.

The measurement of "reasonable" or

"due diligence" is relative, reflecting the scale and complexity
of a proposed project, any natural or climatic difficulties, and
the state of irrigation technology at the time of the appropriation
United States Hearing Memorandum, 16, 19-20, 22.
While the calculus of "due diligence," then, is a
complex one, state laws have codified these principles into
specific time limits for completion of an appropriation -- most
UNITED STATES' RESPONSE - Page 6
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commonly, three to five years, but occasionally as long as twelve

1
2

3

years -- which serve to frame our general expectations as to due
3/
diligence.- United States Hearing Memorandum, 17.
These statutory time limits, like the more general

4

concept of a "reasonable period of time," may be subject to

5

extension, due to acts of God, unforeseen natural difficulties,

6

and the like.

7

purely personal to the appropriator, such as ill health or financia

8

difficulties.

9

They are not postponed, however, by circumstances

United States Hearing Memorandum, 18, 20, 22, 23.

Certain statements regarding due diligence made by

10

counsel for the defendant and for the State of Washington at the

11

Final Argument (October 1, 1982), require that three specific

12

points be clarified in greater detail.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

(a)
allotment can

Only the initial successor-in-interest to an Indian
p~rfect

reserved rights, through due diligence.

It is important to make clear that only the original
non-Indian purchaser of an Indian allotment may perfect any
inchoate reserved rights to water.

The Ninth Circuit's entire

discussion of rights of "the non-Indian purchaser" is in the
context of the initial passage of title from Indian to non-Indian
hands; any reserved right thus acquired must be "maintained by
continued use" or "it is lost."

Walton at 51.

Any other principle

would magnify uncertainty in western water law and "withhold the
application of the water to a beneficial use, which is against
the policy recognized in the development of arid lands."

United

See also United

25
26

States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928).

27
28
29
30
31

pending ("once land passes out of Indian ownership, all subsequent

3/ Statutes also specify a maximum period by which
work must begin, usually within one or two years after a permit
is issued. United States Hearing Memorandum, 17.

32
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States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336, 349 (D. Or. 1979), appeal

conveyances are subject to the doctrine of prior appropriation").
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The Whams were the original non-Indian purchasers of the

1
2

3
4
5

Indian allotments that are the subject of this litigation.
only the Whams' water appropriation is at issue.

are not pertinent in establishing the amount of water with a

4/

reservation priority date.(b)

10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25
26
27

28
29
30
31

Intent is a vital element of appropriation, and

the boundary of "due diligence."

8
9

Any of the

defendants' submissions regarding subsequent sucessors-in-interest

6

7

Hence,

Counsel for the defendant is correct in calling attention
(Final Argument, 22), to the principle that in water law "[t]he
doctrine of common sense applies.
intention is an important factor."
Wash. 9, 15, 224 Pac. 29 (1924).

In making the appropriation
In Re Alpowa Creek, 129
Indeed, the concept of "reasonabl

diligence" is incoherent without the element of intent as the
framework.

The two concepts must be combined in order to define

appropriation.

See In Re Alpowa Creek, supra, at 13 ("[a]n

appropriation of water consists of an intention to appropriate
followed by a reasonable diligence in applying the water to a
beneficial use"); Offield v. Ish, 21 Wash. 277, 57 Pac. 809
(1899) ("[a]ppropriation of water consists in the intention,
accompanied by reasonable diligence, to use the water for the
purposes originally contemplated at the time of its diversion");
see also United States v. Big Bend Transit Co., 42 F. Supp. 459,
469 (E.D. Wash. 1941), citing In Re Alpowa Creek, supra, at 15.
State law commonly measures appropriative intent by
the submission of a plan to the state with a permit application,
or by the posting of an appropriative notice plan.

United States

4/ The water usage of subsequent owners is relevant,
however, in that a reserved right perfected by the original
purchaser may be lost through non-use by a subsequent owner.
Walton at 51.

UNITED STATES' RESPONSE - Page 8
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Hearing Memorandum, 18-20.

The intented plan must be concrete

1

and workable, not "remote, speculative and fanciful."

2

McBride, 75 Wash. 466, 135 Pac. 228 (1913).

Thorp v.

3
4

the Whams' intent to appropriate a greater amount of water than

5

they actually used.

6

of such intent, supported by a valid justification for their

7

failure to appropriate, could the concept of "due diligence"

8

have resulted in a higher measure of water for the Whams than

9

that actually appropriated.

These proceedings to date are devoid of any evidence of

Yet it is indisputable that only with evidence

Such intent might have been establishe

10

by a water diversion notice, a known irrigation plan or testimony

11
12

of neighbors or family members.

13
14
15
16
17

this threshold requirement of establishing an intention to appropri te

record.

No such evidence exists in the

Because the defendants cannot show that the Whams met

additional water, the Waltons cannot now be heard to invoke the
factors mitigating the "due diligence" requirement.
(c)

Factors such as world wars, the Great Depression,

prolonged drought or excessive precipitation do not significantly

18

affect the standard of due diligence applied to a small private

19

appropriation.

20
21
22
23
24

The absence of any evidence of the Whams' intent to
appropriate additional water makes it unnecessary to consider the
legitimacy of any "inhibiting" factors.

Yet even were we to assum

some frustrated intent to appropriate, it is plain that no legally
cognizable "inhibiting" factors were present.

Hence, the Whams

25

cannot be said to have applied "due diligence" to the perfection

26
27

of any additional water rights they may have desired.

28
29
30

period from about 1925 to 1950 as an uninterrupted series of

31

Counsel for the State of Washington has depicted the

catastrophes which excuse any failure successfully to appropriate
water.

Allegedly they include an Agricultural Depression, the

UNITED STATES RESPONSE - Page 9
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Great Depression, drought conditions, World War II, and then a

1
2

period of excessive rain.

Final Argument, 12-14.

This logic

ends in the proposition that no one in the west for a quarter of

3
4
5

a century could be held to have lost a water appropriation through

6

Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41, 45 (1926); State v. Icicle Irrigation

7
8
9
10
11

lack of due diligence - a notion that is plainly contradicted by
the case law.

See,

~~

Hunter Land Co. v. Laugenour, 140

District, 159 Wash. 524, 294 Pac. 245 (1930); Maricopa County v.
Southwest Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, 4 P.2d 369 (1931), modified
and reh. denied, 39 Ariz. 367, 7 P.2d 254 (1932); Morse v. Gold
Beach Water Light & Power Co., 160 Or. 301, 84 P.2d 113 (1938).
Washington state law contains no room for "justificationsr

12

of delay as generalized and vague as those enumerated above.

13

Specific factors which do affect the reasonable diligence standard

14
15
16
17

include concrete matters "incidental to the enterprise itself,"
Grant Realty Co. v. Ham, Yearsly, & Ryrie, 96 Wash. 616, 165 Pac.
495 (1917), for example, time spent in litigation regarding
one's title to the land or water at issue, id.; federal government

18

delays regarding a water project application, United States v.

19

Big Ben Transit Co., 42 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Wash. 1941); "natural"

20

constraints, In Re Alpowa Creek, supra; or the length of season

21
22
23
24

in which construction is possible, Pleasant Valley Irrigation &
Power Co. v. Okanogan Power & Irrigation Co., 98 Wash. 401, 167
Pac. 1122 (1917).
These factors cannot absolve a complete delay of so

25

long a time span as 25 years for a private, relatively small

26

appropriation.

27

comparable period for perfecting an appropriation, it was only

28

upon a strong showing of initial appropriative intent coupled

29
30

with continuous, steady progress over a thirty-year period.

31

In a case in which a Washington court allowed a

In

Re Alpowa Creek, supra.
UNITED STATES' RESPONSE - Page 10
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t

.

..

The laws of other western states are in general accord

1
2

with those of Wash ington.

3

depression as factors effecting due diligence.

4

however, only concern projects of a scale so massive that their

5

progress is genuinely contingent on broad social and economic

6

trends.

7

Lakes Reservoir

8
9

see also Clark, 5 Waters

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

It should be noted that a rare court

has mentioned factors such as labor strikes, wars, or economic
Even these cases,

See Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Twin

& Canal Co., 181 Colo. 53, 506 P.2d 1226 (1973);
& Water Rights

§

409.3 n. 8.

In sum, only the activit i es to appropriate water by
the initial non - Indian purchasers, the Whams, may be considered
in the perfection of reserved rights.

The action of the defendant

Waltons, remote successors-in-interest, a r e irrelevant in this
regard.

Because there is no ev iden ce that the Whams intended to

appropriate water in addition to that which they put to use,
on l y the amount they actually us e d could have enjoyed a reservatio
priority date.

Standards mitigating " due diligence" are irrelevan

to the Whams or their successors to the lands involved.

Even if

one assumed an int ention to appropriate add itional water , however,
the circumstances do not justify any fai lure or delay on their
part in making the appropriation.
Respectfully submitted,

22
23

24

25
26
27
28

JOHN E . LANP
Unit e d States Attorney

SWEE
Assistant United States
Post Office Box 1494
Spokane, Washington 99210-1494
(509) 456-381 1

29
30
31
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